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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CECIL WOODARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
W. BRENT JENSEN,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff,

SUPREME COURT NO. 870346

vs.
RICHARD SEVERIN and
MRS. RICHARD SEVERIN
Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The appellant is herein referred to as Woodard and the
respondents, Richard Severin and Mrs. Richard Severin, are referred
to as the Severins. W. Brent Jensen, the defendant and thirdparty plaintiff, who is the seller named in the land sale agreement
dated September 21, 1972, is referred to as Jensen.
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals on the granting of Woodard's petition for writ of
certiorari.

This brief is filed pursuant to a letter from the

Supreme Court, dated March 24, 1988, granting twenty days from
such date to file a proper brief of appellant.

Rule 48(b) of the

Rules of the Utah Supreme Court authorizes the filing of a brief
after the granting of a petition for writ of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Woodard is entitled to the reformation and

specific performance of the 1972 agreement to purchase land.
2.

Whether Woodard is entitled to the land in dispute

as against the Severins who had actual notice of Woodard1s interest.
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to

order reversal for the failure of the trial court to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on all material issues.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
"Recording necessary to impart notice Operation and effect - Interest of person
not named in instrument.
"Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth
an agreement to convey any real estate or
whereby any real estate may be affected, to
operate as notice to third persons shall be
proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county
in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties
thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment,
certification or record, and as to all other
persons who have had actual noticed Neither
the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such
instrument is designated as trustee, or that
the conveyance otherwise purports to be in
trust without naming the beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate
to charge any third person with notice of the
interest of any person or persons not named
-2-

in such instrument or of the grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him
by such instrument free and clear of all claims
not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the
property charged with such interest/'
(Emphasis Added)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a suit for reformation and specific performance
of a 1972 agreement between Jensen, seller, and Woodard, buyer,
for the sale of five (5) acres of land, in which the legal description of the land sold was erroneous due to a mutual mistake of
fact.
During or about September 1972, Woodard and Jensen met
and discussed the purchase by Woodard of a five-acre parcel of
land.

(R. 287)

The land is in the mountains, about eight miles

from Wanship, West of Echo Canyon, near subdivisions of lots for
cabin sites. At the time of the meeting the land was unsurveyed
and unimproved by buildings or other structures.

Jensen told

Woodard that no land in the area had been sold and that he, Woodard, could buy any five-acre parcel. Woodard selected a parcel
(R. 318) and he and Jensen indicated a corner with a pile of
rocks. (R. 288)
Jensen, with Woodard's help, prepared a document entitled
"Agreement", dated September 21, 1972, a copy of which is attached
hereto and is marked Appendix "A".
290, 316-319).

Pages 27

-

28.

(R. 289,

There was an oral agreement at the time the
-3-

parties met on the five-acre parcel that Woodard could buy any
five-acre parcel as long as he kept the lines straight.
Jensen prepared the legal description.

(R. 318)

(R. 320)

On the day the agreement was signed, Woodard paid to
Jensen $7,000. cash on the purchase price (R. 290), and delivered
to him 6000 shares of ADAK Corporation stock
delivered title to a pick-up truck to Jensen.

(R. 291). He later
(R. 291)

In a

promissory note dated December 8, 1973, (Appendix "B", page 29 )>
Jensen agreed to dig the footings and basement for the Woodard
cabin.

(See Exhibit 21-P and R. 291-294)

In August of 1973,

Jensen's employees dug the footings and basement and Woodard
installed an "I" beam, put on decking, and prepared the cabin for
the first floor level.

(R. 294)

(See also Exhibits 22-P, 23-P,

24-P, 25-P, 26-P, and 27-P consisting of checks for material and
labor which support Woodardfs testimony as to when the cabin was
constructed).
The legal description in the agreement is of land in
the Southwest quarter of Section 28, Township 1 North, Range 4
East, SLB&M, and the land selected by Woodard, which he believed
to be accurately described, was actually in the Northwest quarter
of Section 28. See Exhibits 18-D and overlay 18-A.

Jensen ad-

mitted that he owned the North half of Section 28 in 1972 and
that he did not own any land in the South half of the Section (R.
476).

He testified that when he prepared the description in the

agreement, he assumed that he was describing land from the West
quarter corner and that he had made a mistake.
-4-

(R. 476, 477)

Woodard filed his complaint against Jensen on December
10, 1974, for specific performance of the Agreement dated September
(Appendix "An and R. 2-5)

21, 1972.

He sought a deed to the

real estate described in paragraph 1 and in Note No. 1 of the
Agreement.

In his separate answer, Jensen admitted that he did

sell to Woodard the real estate described in paragraph 3 of the
agreement and gave Woodard a first right and option to purchase
other property "....when said property was properly recorded,".
(R. 10, 11)
The first reference in the file to the mutual mistake
of fact in deeding to Severin the land previously sold to Woodard
appears in a report of a pre-trial settlement conference dated
June 1, 1979, where it is stated:
"It appears that from representations of
Counsel that the defendant in a mutual mistake
of fact deeded the property which is the subject matter of this action to one Richard
Severin. It appears to the Court that in
order that this matter may be settled once and
for all, that the defendants should file a
third party complaint against Severin to set
the deed aside on the basis that it was given
in error. Counsel have represented that the
contract with the plaintiff was entered into
prior to the time that the property was deeded
to Mr. Severin. However, the contract was not
recorded. Therefore, upon motion of Mr. Adams
and the concurrence of Mr. Nygaard, the Court
authorizes the defendants to file a third-party
complaint against Mr. Severin to have the deed
set aside. At such time as the case is again
at issue, plaintiff may make application for
a new trial date." (R. 68)
On July 6, 1979, Jensen filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Severins in which he admitted that he had "....mistakenly and erroneously conveyed right, title, and interest in
-5-

and to the subject real property to the Third Party Defendants....1'
He also alleged that prior to such conveyance he had conveyed
"....right, title, and interest to the subject real property to
the plaintiff.11

(R.

70)

In paragraph 8 he alleged:

"The Plaintiff's right, title, and interest
in and to the subject real property is superior
to the Third Party Defendant's interest in and
to the subject real property."
He sought an order "....rescinding the mistaken portion of the
conveyance between the defendant and the Third Party Defendants
and conveying and quieting title to and in this mistaken portion
to the Plaintiff."

(R. 70)

The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on April
11, 1980, increasing the amount of damages demanded, (R. 103). A
third amended complaint was filed on October 17, 1980, alleging
for the first time the mistake in the description of the real
property the parties intended to sell and purchase and upon which
the plaintiff built his cabin. This third amended complaint
seeks reformation of the agreement dated September 21, 1972, and
specific performance of the agreement, as reformed, and an order
requiring the Severins to quit claim to the plaintiff the

five-

acre parcel of land on which the Woodard cabin was built.

(R.

107-111)
In his answer to the third amended complaint, Jensen
admitted the mistake (R. 134) and also admitted the mistake in
his third party complaint.

(R. 69, 70)

-6-

Jensen also pleaded that

the issues between Woodard and the Severins was "....due to mutual
mistake by both the plaintiff and defendant."

(R. 180)

The Severins started constructing a summer home in 1973
(R. 441) about three weeks after the footings were poured on the
Woodard cabin.

(R. 303)

The Severin cabin was about 250 to 300

feet from the Woodard cabin, according to Woodardfs testimony.
(R. 297)

The relative locations of the two cabins are shown on

Exhibit 20-D which is a map prepared by Interwest Engineering
Corporation.
in 1974.

(R.

Severin first saw the footings of the Woodard cabin
452)

The Severins started acquiring land in the North half
of Section 28 by a deed dated August 20, 1973, Exhibit 1-D, and
acquired additional land in 1974, 1976, and 1977. See Exhibits
2-D, 3-D, 5-D, D-35, and D-36.

Exhibit 5-D, dated July 30, 1976,

describing 56.01 acres, covers the land where the Woodard cabin
is built.
Richard Severin met Woodard in 1973 at Kent Jensen's
cabin.

(R. 301) Woodard testified that he was discussing with

Kent Jensen getting a road cut into where he planned to build his
cabin, and Severin said:

"I hope you're not going to just build

a shack over there, because I am going to build a nice cabin."
(R. 302) Woodard testified that he had seen Severin a time or
two when the footings were being poured (R. 302), and later from
time to time about building the cabins.

(R. 304)

Severin did

not interfere and never told Woodard that he owned the land.
(R. 305, 306)

Severin testified that at the time he first met
-7-

Woodard he was told that Woodard had an agreement to buy five
acres of land near his property and had been told that many
times.

(R. 460-468)

He said he could very well have said,

"Don't build a shack or something,"

(R. 441)

The evidence is that there is a road which was used for
access to both the Severin and Woodard cabins across which Severin
had constructed a gate.

(R. 300)

Woodard a key to the gate.

In 1977 or 1978, Severin gave

(R. 301, 470)

Severin recalled a conversation with Woodard when he
asked him why he was building his cabin when it wasn't his land,
and Woodard said something to the effect that Jensen had sold him
the land and that it was his land.

(R. 466)

about it and did not seek legal advice.

Severin did nothing

(R. 467)

Despite the admissions by Jensen in his pleadings
(R. 70, 134, 180) and in his testimony (R. 475, 476) that there
was a mutual mistake of fact as to the location of the land intended to be sold by the written agreement, Appendix "A", the
trial court, in deciding the case in favor of the Severins, made
no findings of fact and conclusions of law on mutual mistake of
fact, reformation, actual notice of the 1972 Agreement by the
Severins, and the equitable right to enforce the reformed agreement.
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court, stating that the equitable remedies of reformation
and specific performance are not available in this case. Appendix
"C", pages 30 - 34.
-8-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue between Woodard and the Severins as to the
ownership of the five acre parcel of land erroneously described
in the 1972 land sale agreement between Jensen, as seller, and
Woodard, as buyer, is the only issue involved in this appeal.
Woodard paid $7,000 cash, transferred a truck to Jensen on the
purchase price, and took possession of the land in 1972, and he
and Jensen partially constructed a summer home thereon. Jensen,
with Woodardfs help, prepared the land description in the agreement and, by mistake, tied it to the southwest corner of an unsurveyed, unimproved section of mountain land instead of to the
west quarter corner of the section.

The mistake is admitted by

Jensen in his pleadings and testimony.
In 1976, Jensen sold to the Severins a 56.01 tract of
land which included the five acre parcel sold to Woodard in 1972.
Severin had notice of Woodardfs interest in the land several
years before 1976, yet he did nothing to prevent Woodard from
building his cabin. At a pre-trial settlement conference in
1979, the mutual mistake of fact as to the description of the
five-acre parcel first became evident and the trial court authorized the defendants to file a third party complaint against the
Severins to have the 1976 deed set aside.

The plaintiff was

authorized to file a third amended complaint.

After being brought

into the case, the Severins filed a pleading entitled "third
party complaint and counterclaim" against Woodard and Jensen to
-9-

quiet their title to the five acre parcel. Woodard answered,
putting in issue the respective claims of Woodard and the Severins.

The judgment quieted the Severins title against Woodard and

does not mention mutual mistake of fact, reformation, or specific
performance of the 1972 agreement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, holding that the equitable remedies of reformation and specific performance are not available in the instant
case.

This decision is based solely on Jensen's understanding of

Summit County's new requirements for ,!... .recording recreational
property11.

There is no evidence in the record of any ordinance

containing these requirements.
Woodard contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
failing to reverse the judgment of the trial court and for its
failure to order reformation of the agreement to correct the
admitted mutual mistake.

The Court of Appeals also erred in

failing to order specific performance of the agreement as against
both Jensen and the Severins.

In 1976, the Severins bought the

56.01 acre parcel, with actual notice of the 1972 Woodard-Jensen
land sale agreement.
The Court of Appeals further erred in failing to reverse
the decision of the trial court, because it failed to make any
finding of fact or conclusion of law on the issues of the intent
of the parties to the agreement, Severin's notice of the agreement,
mutual mistake, reformation, and specific performance.
failure is reversible error.
-10-

Such

ARGUMENT
I.

WOODARD IS ENTITLED TO REFORMATION
AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE 1972 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE LAND
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, quoted only the
part of the 1972 Agreement favorable to the conclusion reached
which relates to the recording with Summit County of Lot No. 1,
to the purchase of Lot No. 2 in Forest Meadow Ranch, Plat C, and
to the agreement to furnish title insurance.

See Appendix "A".

The Court significantly omitted from its opinion the following:
ff

4. The seller agrees to provide cullinary
water to Lot No. 1 through a central water system.
"5. The seller warrants to the buyer that a
properly installed septic tank system will meet all
county and state requirements for sewage disposal
and no accessment (sic) will be made for a sewage
hook-up«
"6. Terms of the sale. The buyer agrees to
pay $7,000.00 in cash and 8,000 shares of Adak
Energy Corporation stock hereinafter referred to
as the Stock. The seller acknowledges the stock
is investment stock and at the present time is not
tradable. The seller agrees that the stock will
be held in escrow in the sellers name at the main
office of Walker Bank & Trust, Salt Lake City, Utah
until said stock becomes free trading. The buyer
guarantees to the seller that the stock will have
a market value of $1 per share on or before October
1, 1974, and that the seller will be able to sell
through a broker the stock for $1 a share. The
buyer retains an option to purchase back the said
stock for $1 per share on or before October 1, 1974."
It was obvious error for the Court of Appeals to consi
only a part of the agreement.

"It is well established that a

contract must be construed as a whole and the intentions of the
-11-

parties thereto must be collected from the entire instrument and
not from detached portions." O'Malley Investment v Trimble,
(Ariz 1967) 422 P2d 740.
The Court of Appeals then decided that in the absence
of proof that Lot No. 1 was recorded in Summit County, the condition precedent in the agreement had not been fulfilled and that,
therefore, "....the equitable remedies of reformation and specific
performance of the agreement are not available to Woodard."
Appendix

,f ,f

C , pages 33-34.
The decision based on this technical point ignored the

facts recited in the statement of the case that both parties to
the Agreement treated it as a Contract of Sale, and completely
ignored the "unfulfilled11 condition of recording.

These facts

include:
(1)

Payment of $7,000. cash and delivery of 6,000

shares of stock which the buyer, in paragraph 6, guaranteed would
be worth one dollar per share by October 1, 1974.
(2) The loan of $4,800, in December, 1972, to Jensen
for which Jensen agreed "....to do the following items for Cecil
Woodard's cabin:
"1.

dig and pour footings

"2.

dig basement

"3.

cut driveway

"4.

install septic tank

,f

to pay for all the materials and labor to

5.

cover the cost of items 1,2,3,4
-12-

"6.

The items mentioned above must be done on or

before July 1, 1973."
See Appendix "B".
3.

The transfer by Woodard to Jensen, in December,

1972, of a Ford truck of a value of $4,800- for payment on the
purchase price as a substitute for the return of the shares of
stock.

(R.

291)

4. • Jensen's employees dug the footings and basement
in August of 1973 and Woodard installed an "I" beam, put the
cinder block up, put the decking on top, and prepared the cabin
for the first floor level.
5.

(R. 294)

The tender by Woodard to Jensen of $3,200., the

balance due on the purchase price.
6.

(R. 108)

The admission by Jensen in several pleadings that

there was a mutual mistake as to the legal description of the
five acre parcel that Jensen intended to sell and Woodard intended
to buy.

(R. 69, 70, 134, and 180)
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended

that the parcel marked on the ground was to be sold.

It is

equally clear from the conduct of the parties, namely Jensen and
Woodard, that the Agreement was not an option and that the parties
did not intend that the recording of the subdivision was a controlling condition to the existence of the Agreement.

If they intended

otherwise, Woodard would not have paid $11,800 on the purchase
price and they would not have built the cabin.
-13-

We quote from Williston on Contracts, (Jaeger) 3rd Ed.,
Vol. 4, at page 815:
"It is said that the conduct of the parties
is of material weight in determining what the
parties intended
in case of ambiguity, the practical construction given by the parties to the contract over a period of years is persuasive. But
when the contract is clear, the fact that the parties
followed a different plan cannot work a revocation
of the plain agreement. Where there is doubt as
to the proper construction of an instrument, the
conduct of the parties is entitled to great consideration. But where its meaning is clear in the eye
of the law, the error of the parties cannot control
its effect11.
In the case of Matanuska Valley Farmers Coop v. Monaghan,
(1951) 188 F2d 906, the Court held:
"Since the parties to the contract have in
fact followed the method of payment from the outset
and have made no attempt to conform to the provisions of paragraph 7, they must be deemed to have
modified the written contract by mutual agreement.
It is well established that parties to a contract
can, by mutual agreement, modify or rescind a contract and adopt in its stead a new agreement. An
agreement to change the terms of a contract may be
shown by the conduct of the parties as well as by
evidence of an explicit agreement to Modify."
Citations in support of the foregoing include:
3 Williston on Contracts, Sec 623, N. 6 1936;
Whitehurst v FCX Fruit & Vegetable Service, (1944)
224 N.C. 628, 32 SE2d 34, 39;
City Messenger & Delivery Co. v Postal Telegraph,
(1915) 74 Or 433, 145 P. 657;
Saul v. Mclntyre, (1948) 57 Atl 2d 272, 274;
Margoles v. Mollenick, (1906) 98 NYS 349.
The Utah cases that hold that a written contract will
be reformed to express the agreement of the parties where the
proof of mutual mistake is clear, definite, and convincing are:

-14-

Peterson v. Eldredge, (1952) 122 Utah 96, 246 P2d 886;
Sine v. Harper, (1950) 118 Utah 415, 222 P2d 571;
Janke v. Beckstead, (1958) 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P2d 933.
In this case, the mutual mistake in the description of
the land is admitted by Jensen in his pleadings.
180, 475, 476)

(R. 70, 134,

The intention of the parties was to sell and

purchase Lot No. 1, as erroneously described, and not Lot No. 2
referred to in the Agreement.

The intended lot was that marked

on the ground with a pile of rocks on which the Woodard cabin was
built by Woodard and Jensen's employees in 1973. The description
was later determined by a survey and is contained in paragraph 8
of the Third Amended Complaint.

(R. 323)

The Court of Appeals dismissed the remedies of reformation and specific performance by stating:
"The equitable remedies of reformation and
specific performance are not available in the
instant case." See Appendix "C" at pages 33-34.
No reason is given in the opinion for disregarding the
intentions of the parties and these equitable remedies. Woodard
paid nearly all of the purchase price for the parcel marked on
the ground and spent thousands of dollars on the summer cabin.
He was certainly entitled to the relief given others by this
Court.

-15-

I_I.
WOODARD IS ENTITLED TO THE LAND IN DISPUTE
AGAINST THE SEVERINS WHO TOOK TITLE
WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF WOODARD'S INTEREST
The Court of Appeals based its opinion entirely on the
portion of the 1972 Agreement to the effect that there was a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the Agreement, namely
that Lot 1 had to be recorded "with Summit County".
pages 33-34.

Appendix "C",

Further, the Court of Appeals, on the same pages,

stated that after the execution of the Agreement "....Jensen discovered Summit County had changed its requirements for recording
recreational property.

The new requirements, as Jensen understood

them, made it impossible for him to subdivide and record Woodardfs
desired property."
There is no proof in the record of any law or ordinance
of Summit County on the subject at all*

An effort was made by

Jensen's attorney to get Jensen's conclusion regarding restrictions
on his right to sell in the record, and on motion, the testimony
of Jensen was stricken.

(R. 371) Absent such proof, the Agreement

between the parties was valid.
Section 57-1-6, UCA, quoted above, on page 2, provides
that a contract shall be binding between the parties and without
proofs, acknowledgment, certification, or record as to all other
persons who have actual notice.

It is true that the recorded

agreement, with the land described as being in the wrong quarter
section, did not, as a matter of law, give the Severins notice,
but they took title to Woodardfs 1972 Agreement because they had
-16-

actual notice.

There can be no doubt as to the agreement being

binding as between Woodard and Jensen. Woodard paid in cash and
by transfer of a truck $11,800 on a $15,000 purchase price for
the conveyance of the five acres of land, and tendered the balance
of $3,200, as stated in the Third Amended Complaint (R.108).
Jensen was bound by contract to convey the land.

During the

pendency of this suit, he sold the five acre parcel to the Severins
and conveyed it by the deed dated on July 30, 1976. (Ex. 5-D)
The conveyance to the Severins is subject to the reformed
1972 agreement if, on or before July 30, 1976, the Severins had
actual notice of the Woodard agreement.
This Court has, in several cases, considered the application of the statute and has several times ruled on the question
as to what constitutes actual notice.
In the early case of Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P.
190 (1890), this Court stated the law as follows:
"Our statute requires actual notice and constructive notice is not sufficient. The demands
of the statute are answered if a party dealing
with the land has information of a fact or facts
that would put a prudent man upon inquiry, and
which would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge
of the state of the title; and this is actual
notice. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§597, 598, et seq.
The appellant was in the actual occupancy of the
premises, and actual occupancy is enough to put
parties dealing with the premises upon inquiry.
Id. § 616, note 3, and § 617. But the contention
of the respondents is that the possession of the
appellant was consistent with the title shown by
the record, and therefore the mortgagees were
under no obligation to look beyond the record, and
were authorized to consider her possession as
under her life-estate only. On this question the
authorities are both ways. Id. § 616, note 3, and
-17-

§ 617. We think the better doctrine is that an occupant's possession is actual notice of his title~
and all persons with notice of such possession must
at their peril take notice of his full title in the
premises, no difference what the record shows. Until
the recording statutes were enacted, possession was
notice of ownership, and a conveyance made by a
party out of possession was void. The purpose of
these statutes was not to change the rule that
possession was evidence of title and notice to all
the world of ownership, but to afford the means of
preserving the chain of title, and give notice of
the ownership of unoccupied lands. It would be
an unwarranted application of the recording acts
to say that they destroy the effect of occupancy
as notice and evidence of ownership. We think
therefore, that a person at his peril deals with
or purchases real estate of one, in the possession
of another, although said possession may be consistent with the record title. It is easy to find out
the real situation by inquiry of the party in
possession, and it is his duty to do so. The conclusion, therefore, is that none of these mortgages,
except the one for $350, were liens upon the premises of appellant." (Emphasis added)
This case was followed in 1918 by Shafer v. Killpack,
53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948 (1918), and by the case of Gappmeyer v.
Wilkinson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1919).

In the last case

cited, the defendants Wilkinson (in the same position as the
Severins in this case) were told before the deed was delivered
that certain children were interested in the property to the
extent of $3600; that the property had already been deeded to the
children, and that there were other facts and circumstances indicating that the land had been conveyed by an unrecorded deed.

This

Court held that the second deed was a nullity because the record
showed that the grantee had such notice as would put any reasonable
person upon inquiry to ascertain what the interest was.
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In the more recent case of Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah
173, 91 P2d 454 (1939), this Court stated the rule as follows:
"In 13 L.R.A., N.S., page 51, et seq. 'The
broad rule is laid down by a large number of the
cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive of ownership, is constructive notice to all
the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts,
whether such claim is legal or equitable in its
nature.' Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190;
Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249, 26 P. 300; Neponset
Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P.
573; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 P. 983;
Stahn v. Hall, et al, 10 Utah 400, 37 P. 585;
Dennis v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 20 Wash. 320, 55
P. 210.
"The doctrine of notice of a claim of title
to lands from possession thereof springs from the
apparent, not the true, relation that the person
in possession bears to the title, and rests upon
the theory that actual and visible possession is
a fact of such a character and notoriety as cannot possibly escape the observancy of a subsequent
purchaser or encumbrancer, and is in its nature
sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the rights
of the possessor.' Neponset Land & Live Stock Co.
v. Dixon, supra."
The case of Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 203, 312 P2d 557
(1957), holds that the failure in a duty to inquire is failure of
an element of good faith.
In this case, Woodard went into possession of the five
acre parcel, indicated on the ground by a pile of rocks, in 1972,
started constructing his cabin in 1973, and finished it in 1975,
all within the knowledge of the Severins, and is still in possession.
This alone was enough to constitute actual notice of Woodard's
interest and to defeat the deed as to Woodard's five acres.
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Mr. Severin testified that Woodard had told him that
Jensen had sold him the land. We quote:
"Question (By Mr. Hansen): When Mr. Woodard
started building his cabin -- strike that. Do you
recall when Woodard started building his cabin on
property which you claim is yours?
"Answer: I can't give you the date, but I can
recall a conversation when Cecil came over to get
some water at my cabin, and I asked him why he was
building it when it wasn't his land.
"Question:

And what did he tell you?

"Answer: Well, that something -- well, that -something to the effect that Brent had sold him the
land and that it was his land.
"Question:
"Answer:

What did you then do?

Nothing.

"Question: Did you take any action to prevent him from continuing to build on the property?
"Answer: I didn't take any action to preclude
him from building.
"Question:

Did you ever tell him not to build?

"Answer: It wasn't my place to tell a man not to
build something.
"Question:

But you claim the land to be yours?

"Answer: Right.
"Question: You didn't tell him that he had to
stop building his cabin?
"Answer: No, sir. I am not in a position to
tell a man to stop anything.
"Question:
at that time?
"Answer:

Okay.

No, sir.
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Did you seek legal advice

"Question:

You allowed him to proceed?

"Answer: Yes, sir. I didn't — I allowed
him to proceed to build. I didn't have any -- I
wasn't going to start a war up on that hill."
(R. 466,467)
As indicated, this conversation took place when Woodard
was building his cabin in 1973 or 1974. Severin had a duty to
inquire about Woodardfs interest, and he did nothing.

See also

Mr. Severin's testimony about when he first met Woodard in 1972
or 1973, (R. 453, 484) and testimony of Severin that he had
probably met Woodard fifteen times and every time they met they
discussed Woodard's interest in the property (R. 465,466).
Woodardfs possession and Mr. Severin's testimony establishes actual notice of Woodard's interest.

Without question the

Severins' 1976 deed is subject to Woodard's contract right. This
being an equity suit, the decree should include a provision
requiring the Severins to execute and deliver to Woodard a Quit
Claim Deed conveying to Woodard the land described in paragraph 8
of the third amended complaint. Woodard, by his pleadings, has
tendered the balance of the purchase price to Jensen, and, to
complete the transaction, must pay to Jensen the balance of the
purchase price if he gets a deed to the land from the Severins.
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Ill,
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE TO MAKE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar
as pertinent, provides:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the Court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A .. • •lf
In the case of Romrell v. Zions First National Bank,
611 P2d 392 (Utah 1980), this Court construed the above mentioned
rule and stated the law as follows:
"In the instant case the trial court had
responsibility to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, notwithstanding the advisory
verdict of a jury. Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., states
in part:
(The Court here quotes the above excerpt
from Rule 52(a)).
"This requirement is mandatory and may not
be waived. In re Murphy's Estate, 269 Minn. 393,
131 N.W.2d 220 (1964); 9 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil Sections 2335,
2574 (1971). Failure of the trial court to make
findings of fact on all material issues is reversible error. Rucker v. Dalton (Utah) 598 P.2d
1336 (1979)."
Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P.2d, 909 (1931).
It will be noted that the trial court failed to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following major
issues framed by the pleadings and tried by the court:
-22-

a).

The mutual mistake of fact as to the legal

description in the 1972 agreement,
b).

The intent of the parties to the agreement

that Woodard purchased the land marked on the
ground by a pile of rocks and outlined in crosshatched red on Exhibit 18-D.
c).

Whether Woodard, with the knowledge of the

Severins, was in possession of the five-acre
tract before 1976 when the Severins purchased
the 56.01 acre parcel of land on which the Woodard cabin is located,
d).

Whether the Severins had actual notice of

the Woodard agreement before 1976.
The materiality of each of the foregoing issues of fact
is discussed at length above and will not be repeated here.
The conclusions of law are likewise incomplete and insufficient to support the judgment and are not supported by the
findings of fact.

The major issues of reformation of the 1972

agreement, the specific enforcement thereof, and actual notice of
the agreement by Severins are not even mentioned.
As stated in the quotation from the case of Romrell v.
Zions First National Bank, supra, the provisions of Rule 52(a)
are mandatory and cannot be waived.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding and holding
that the 1972 Agreement was conditional on the recording of a subdivision, that the condition never happened, and that there was
no valid contract to reform or enforce.

The Court significantly

quoted in its opinion only the parts of the Agreement which tended
to support this conclusion, and omitted the part which sets out
the terras of a sale.

The Court, in reaching this conclusion, dis-

regarded the following facts showing the true intentions of the
parties which are either admitted or are clearly established:
1.

Woodard paid $11,800. on a purchase price of $15,000.

and tendered the balance.
2.

Woodard, with the help of Jensen, marked a corner of

the unsurveyed parcel with a pile of rocks and took possession of
the land in 1972.
3.

In 1973 and 1974, Woodard, with Jensen's help,

partially constructed the Woodard cabin with the full knowledge of
the Severins who acquired the land in 1976 with admitted notice of
Woodard's possession and agreement.
4.

Jensen, who prepared the description of the five-

acre parcel, by mistake, tied it to the Southwest corner of the
Section instead of to the West quarter corner.
5.

By their conduct, the parties to the Agreement

treated the transaction as a firm contract of sale and not a
conditional sale or option.
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Further, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
judgment of the trial court, which entirely disregarded Rule
52(a) that makes mandatory, in non-jury, civil cases, the making
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on all material issues.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
and the case remanded, with directions to reform and specifically
enforce the 1972 Agreement, to nullify the part of the 1976 deed
to the Severins which covers the Woodard parcel, and to require
the Severins, upon payment by Jensen of an equitable consideration,
to execute and deliver to Woodard a deed to the five-acre parcel
in dispute.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

E. J. SKS™
50 South^Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the Brief of the Appellant to be mailed, first class
postage prepaid, this

I A ^ day of April, 1988, to the following:

Jerrold S. Jensen
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Third-Party
Defendants-Respondents
Mr. W. Brent Jensen
983 Third Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff
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APPENDIX "A"
AGREEMENT
September 21 , 1972

AG R E E M E N T

This agreement nade and entered into t h i s 21st dny of September, 1972,
by and between W. BRENT JEcISElJ, licreinaf ter referred to as S e l l e r and
CECIL U00DA1U), hereinafter referred to as buyer,

Nov, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s

hereby agreed between the parties as follov;a:
1.

I t i s agreed that the a o i l e r ia desirous of s e l l i n g and the buyer

i s desirous of buying a parcel of ground more s p e c i f i c a l l y described as

No.

1

#«""<?

TMtHctr;

„ .

c

/

. 3C.^

*7*/ir

"3«*

20'«J.

S

&CS~/J;

'thl s a t i l r ^ l s o ^ g r e f s # a T t h & ^ c a l % f t f t f W X>A* i&ttitt'of

5*'*

5

acres•

2.

It io understood that Lot No, 1 ia in the process of bcinj: nade

ready for recording with Sucroit County, Utah and cannot be sold, at this time.
However, seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 io recorded the buyer has first
right and option to purchase Lot No. 1.
3.

Until that time buyer agrees to buy part of Forest Meadow Kanch

Plat C Lot £69, iaore specifically described as beginning at a point 1520 ft.
N, 512 ft. E. from if.W. Cor. Soc. 27, TIN, W E , SLB&M and running thence:
N31* 42 f 41° E. 144.59 ft.; K 83° 43*44" E., 183.10 ft.; N. 09* 27* 44" U.,
60.83 .ft.; W. 73* 28' 27" E, 94.92 ft; South 320 ft., to point of beginning,
hereinafter referred to a6 Lot Mo. 2. At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded
the buyer will release the right and interest in Lot Mo. 2, and vill exercise
his option on Lot No. 1.
4.

The seller agrees to provide cullinary water to Lot No. 1 through a

central water oysteia.
5.

Tne seller warrants to the buyer that a properly installed septic

tank systen will meet all county and atate rcquircnents for oewage disposal
and no acceosnvent will bo cade for a sewage hook-u/.
6.

Terms of the sale.

The buyer agrees to pay $7,000,00 in canh and

8,000 shares of Adak Energy Corporation stock hereinafter referred to on the
Stock.

The seller acknowledges the stock is Investment stock and at the

present time is not tradable.

The seller agrees that the stock will be

held in escrow in the sellers nana at the waiu office of Walker Bank & Trust,

Salt Lake City, Utah until caid etock becomes free trading.

The buyer

guarantees to tho seller that the stock will havo a market value of $1 per
flharc oa or before October 1, 1974, and that the seller vill be able to
sell through a broker the stock for $1 a share.

The buyer retains an

optioa to purchase back the said stock for §1 per share on or before October.1,
1974.
7.

Hie seller hereby agrees to furnish to the buyor Title Xucutaacc

to the property no later than October 1, 1974

Seller '"'/Us,

7^^/^/^yb^^^<^^

W. Brent Jeus^a

M,

Buyo

j.'P

Z/AjUk

Cecil Woodard-

Beginning at a point North, 660 ft. end Cast, 520 ft. from the S.W,
c o m e r aec. 28, tin, R4E, SLB&« and running hence H 61 * 30' £, 670 ft.;
U 30° 00 1 W, 330 ft,; S. 61° 20« W, 665 ft.I S 76° 30» Z> 170 ft. ;
S 46° 40 1 E, 60 ft..; South, 60 ft.; S 18° 3Q» W, 130 ft, to the point
-of beginning.

Seller &/¥&£&'
W # Brent Jopean

Buyers
Cecil Woodard
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APPENDIX "B"
PROMISSORY NOTE
December 08, 1972

PROMISSORY NOTE
December 08, 1972

For Value received, I promise to pay Cecil Woodard $4,800.00 with
interest payable November 1, 1974, at the rate of 1% per annum.

In

consideration for this loan, I agree to do the following items for
Cecil Woodard!s cabin:

1.

dig and pour footings

2.

dig basement

3.

cut driveway

4.

install septic tank

5. to pay for all the materials and labor to cover the cost of
items 1,2,3,4
6.

The items mentioned above must be done on or before July 1, 1973

W. Brent Jensen
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APPENDIX "C"
OPINION
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 860037-CA
Filed July 27, 1987

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Cecil Woodard/
Plaintiff and Appellant/
OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
W. Brent Jensen
Defendant and Third-Party/
Plaintiff/
v.

Case No. 860037-CA

Richard Severin and
Mrs. Richard Severin#

FILED

Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.
Before Judges Garff# Bench and Jackson.

~

Jill

9«71Q07

r-

-

Timothy M. Shea
Clerl; of the Court
Uta
^ Court of Appeals

BENCH, Judge:
Cecil Woodard appeals a trial court judgment quieting
title in Richard and Donna Severin to a five acre parcel of
property. We affirm.
In 1972/ Woodard met with a developer/ W. Brent Jensen,
to discuss the purchase by plaintiff of five acres of mountain
property, owned by Jensen# as a cabin site. They agreed on a
parcel and marked a corner with a pile of rocks. On September
21/ 1972/ Woodard and Jensen executed a written agreement/
prepared by them/ which states in pertinent part:
This agreement made and entered into
this 21st day of September/ 19729 by and
between W. BRENT JENSEN/ hereinafter
referred to as Seller and CECIL WOODARD/
hereinafter referred to as buyer. Now,
therefore, it is hereby agreed between the
parties as follows:
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1. It is agreed that the seller is
desirous of selling and the buyer is
desirous of buying a parcel of ground more
specifically described as
[a metes and bounds legal description
is written in by hand]•
The seller also agrees that this parcel of
land will be a minimum of 5 acres•
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is in
the process of being made ready for
recording with Summit County, Utah and
cannot be sold at this time. However,
seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 is
recorded the buyer has first right and
option to purchase Lot No. 1.
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy
part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot
#69, more specifically described as
[legal description typed in]
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At
the time Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer
will release the right and interest in Lot
No. 2, and will exercise his option on Lot
No. 1.
*

*

*

7. The Seller hereby agrees to furnish to
buyer Title Insurance to the property no
later than October 1, 1974.
The handwritten legal description in paragraph one was entered
by Jensen a day or two after execution of the agreement.
Approximately one week later, Jensen typed in a legal
description of the property at the end of the second page of
the agreement and the two men again executed the agreement.
Both descriptions erroneously described a five acre parcel
south of the property Woodard selected which Jensen did not
even own.
Woodard paid Jensen $7,000.00 cash and delivered 6,000
shares of stock to him as a down payment on the property.
Woodard also delivered to Jensen title to a truck as partial
payment and in exchange for Jensen's agreement to dig the
footings and basement for the cabin. In August, 1973, despite
having no title yet in the property, Woodard began construction
of his cabin on the five acre parcel of property he had
selected.

860037-CA
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Meanwhile/ and also in August, 1973, Jensen conveyed a
17.59 acre parcel, just south of Woodard*s cabin, to Richard
and Donna Severin. The Severins also began construction oi a
cabin that month• The parties met occasionally and discussed
their cabins. At one time, Richard Severin asked Woodard why
he was building on land he did not own. Woodard told Severin
he had an agreement with Jensen to purchase the property.
Jensen conveyed additional property to the Severins on November
22, 1974.
On December 10, 1974, Woodard filed a complaint against
Jensen seeking specific performance of the agreement and
execution of a warranty deed to the property described in
paragraph one and at the bottom of page two. In his answer
filed January 7, 1975, Jensen admitted he sold to Woodard the
property in paragraph three and further gave him a first right
and option to purchase other property when recorded. Woodard
filed an amended complaint adding an alternative remedy of
money damages in light of Jensen*s possible inability to
fulfill the condition of recording under the agreement*
On July 30, 1976, Jensen, through Security Title Company,
conveyed 56 acres to the Severins by special warranty deed.
This acreage encompasses the prior two conveyances from Jensen
to the Severins plus most of the five acres claimed by
Woodard. On December 27, 1977, Jensen again through Security
Title Company conveyed ten more acres to the Severins which
encompasses the remainder of the property claimed by Woodard.
At a pre-trial conference between Woodard and Jensen, the
parties realized the mutual mistake committed in the
description of the property. The trial court authorized Jensen
to file a third-party complaint against the Severins to rescind
the five acre portion of the deed claimed by Woodard. Jensen
filed his third-party complaint on July 6, 1979 which was later
dismissed by the court.
Woodard filed a second amended complaint on April 11, 1980,
increasing the requested damages. Then, on October 17, 1980,
he filed a third amended complaint alleging for the first time
mutual mistake in the original agreement. Woodard offered a
substitute legal description of the property and requested
reformation and specific performance of the agreement and an
order requiring the Severins to execute and deliver a quitclaim
deed to the disputed five acres. In the alternative, Woodard
requested $63,500.00 in damages.
Trial was held July 8 and 9, 1982. The court found the
1972 agreement was not a conveyance of title to the property
and that the Severins were, through a series of recorded
conveyances, the record title owners of the disputed property.
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Woodard was held to have no right, title, or interest in said
property and was, therefore, estopped to claim specific
performance of the agreement or a deed to the property* As
between Woodard and Jensen, the court ordered Jensen to pay him
$25,300.00 in damages, the value of the property with
improvements ($28,500.00) less the balance due on the agreed
price ($3,200.00).
On appeal, Woodard argues the trial court erred in ignoring
in its findings, conclusions, and judgment the following
determinative issues: reformation of the agreement, admitted
mutual mistake, specific performance of the reformed agreement,
possession of the land by Woodard, and actual notice of the
Severins. He asks this Court to reverse the judgment and
remand with instructions to reform and specifically enforce the
agreement against the Severins.
The equitable remedies of reformation and specific
performance are not available in the instant case. As Woodard
and Jensen discussed the purchase and sale of the property,
Jensen informed him the contract he had with the original
sellers prohibited conveyances of less than ten acres unless
the property was in a recorded subdivision. The parties
incorporated this condition into the agreement:
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is in
the process of being made ready for
recording with Summit County, Utah and
cannot be sold at this time. However,
seller agrees that when Lot No. 1 is
recorded the buyer has first right and
option to purchase Lot No. 1.
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy
part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot
#69, more specifically described as
[legal description typed in]
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At
the time Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer
will release the right and interest in Lot
No. 2, and will exercise his option on Lot
No. 1. (Emphasis added.)
However, subsequent to execution of the agreement, Jensen
discovered Summit County had changed its requirements for
recording recreational property. The new requirements, as
Jensen understood them, made it impossible for him to subdivide
and record Woodardfs desired property.
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Both before and after October 1, 1974/ the date by which
Jensen was to furnish title insurance to Woodard/ Jensen told
Woodard that because he was unable to record the subdivision-/
he could not convey the property. He suggested various
alternatives, all of which Woodard rejected.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled where a certain event or
situation is essentially made a condition to an agreement/ the
absence of such event or situation precludes specific
performance of the agreement. BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d
456 (Utah 1978). In the instant case, recording was clearly a
condition precedent to Jensen*s duty to offer a first right and
option to purchase the property under the agreement. As the
condition precedent of the agreement has not been fulfilled/
the equitable remedies of reformation and specific performance
of the agreement are not available to Woodard.
We therefore affirm the judgment.

Russell W. Bench/ Judge

WE CONCUR:

R. W. Garff/ Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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